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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

MINH NGOC HA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 971746-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of aggravated assault, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(A) (Supp. 1998); and
assault, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 1998)
(copies attached in Add. A).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e)(1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the trial court commit plain error when it accepted defendant's proffer of a
non-certified interpreter when, without any warning, defendant announced that an
interpreter would be necessary for his next and final witness in a two-day trial?

Because defense counsel below registered no objection to the court's use of his
proffered interpreter, defendant must establish plain error on appeal. To do so, defendant
must show that an error occurred, that it should have been obvious to the trial court, and
that it was harmful. State v. Marvin. 964 P.2d 313, 318 (Utah 1998); State v. Finlavson.
956 P.2d 283, 292 (Utah App. 1998), cert, granted (Oct. 10, 1998).
2. Did the trial court commit plain error in failing to sua sponte object to the
prosecutor's initial and rebuttal closing arguments?
Because this issue was not preserved below, the same standard of review noted for
issue 1, supra, applies here.
3. Did defendant's trial counsel provide ineffective assistance when he failed to
object to remarks made in the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument?
When a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is raised for the first time on
appeal, this Court reviews it as a matter of law. State v. Bryant. 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah
App. 1998); State v. Snvder. 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993). Review is highly
deferential to avoid second-guessing counsel's actions with the benefit of hindsight.
Bryant. 965 P.2d at 542; Snvder. 860 P.2d at 354.
4. Does the cumulative effect of the alleged errors warrant reversal of defendant's
convictions?

2

When presented with a claim under the cumulative error doctrine, an appellate
court reviews all identified errors and then determines if their cumulative effect
undermines confidence in the verdict. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to the
resolution of the issues presented on appeal is contained in or appended to this brief,
including:
Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 3-306 (in Add. C).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with aggravated assault, a second degree felony, and
assault, a class B misdemeanor, stemming from a stabbing which occurred in Salt Lake
County on May 19, 1996 (R. 1-2, 34-36). He was apprehended in Seattle, Washington
nearly twelve months later (R. 1-2; 193:129-31).1 Following a two-day trial, a jury
convicted defendant as charged, and the trial judge sentenced him to concurrent sentences
of one-to-fifteen years in prison for the aggravated assault and six months in the county
jail for the assault, plus restitution and costs (R. 131-32). The court also strongly
recommended mental and emotional health counseling at the prison (R. 131, 194:16).
Defendant timely filed an appeal (R. 138).

1

Citation herein to transcripts is to the volume number on the cover of each
transcript volume, followed by a colon and the internal page number, i.e., R. 193:7.
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 19, 1996, eighteen-year-old Tai Luu and his friend Vu Tran picked up Jon
Ha, seventeen-year-old Hanna Kim, and Hanna's friends Diane and Lisa, and went out to
eat (R. 193:44-45, 85-87, 94, 114). Over dinner, they decided to go to Cafe Ha Vi, a
karaoke club in West Valley City frequented that night mostly by Vietnamese (R. 193:4244, 86-87, 114, 124). Tai had never been there before, but Hanna had been there a couple
of times (R. 193:44, 69, 88). Tai drove them to the club, where they danced and
socialized (R. 193:48, 70, 114). Hanna was sure she did not drink any beer that night, but
Tai could not remember whether or not he had (R. 193:48, 70, 95-96).
Eventually, Tai told the group he was ready to go home and left the club with Vu
Tran behind him (R. 193:71, 74). Vu wanted to drive, so Tai headed toward the passenger
side of his car (R. 193:46, 75-76). As they walked to the car, Vu noticed defendant walk
by and heard him say, "What's up?" (R. 193:115-16, 120). Vu parroted the words in
response (R. 193:115, 120). Tai didn't pay much attention and continued to the car (R.
193:46-47, 71, 73-74). When Vu approached the driver's side of Tai's car, he noticed
defendant walk up behind Tai (R. 193:115-16).
As Tai opened the passenger door, he felt a sudden blow to the right side of his
back (R. 193:45, 58, 75, 76, 84, 116). Looking over his shoulder, he saw defendant one
foot away and poised to strike him again (R. 193:45,48-49). Tai had not seen defendant
in the club that night or at any time before that moment and had no idea why he would hit
4

him (R. 193:47). Tai turned and ran through the cars in the parking lot to a chain link
fence twelve to fifteen feet away (R. 193:45, 49, 50, 58, 76-77, 83, 116). As he ran, he
kept his body slightly turned so that he could keep track of defendant's progress (R.
193:101-02). However, as he neared the fence, he became weak and dizzy (R. 193:49,
77-78). When defendant caught up to him, Tai noticed a knife in defendant's right hand
(R. 193:45, 48, 79). Tai grabbed the knife with both hands, trying to keep defendant from
stabbing him, and held it several seconds until he got dizzy (R. 193:45, 49-51, JL. 79-80).
He described the knife as being ten or eleven inches long, seven inches of which was a
three-inch-wide blade (R. 193:45-46).
Meanwhile, Hanna and her friends left the club. Hanna was talking to another
friend in the parking lot when she heard people yelling and screaming in various
languages and someone saying "fight" in English (R. 193:89-90, 98). Turning to look
around the parking lot, Hanna saw defendant chasing Tai and swinging his arm at him (R.
193:90-91, 100). Hanna raced to the pair, reaching Tai as he got to the fence and standing
immediately in front of him facing defendant (R. 193:50, 91, 102-03). She and defendant
yelled at each other while other people tried to hold onto defendant (R. 193:91, 103, 105,
117).
With Hanna between him and defendant, Tai rested against the fence and reached
behind him to where he had been hit (R. 193:50, 80). Suddenly, the weakness, the
dizziness, and the knife made sense to him, and he realized that he had not been hit, but
5

stabbed (R. 193:52). The inside of the jacket he was wearing was soaked with blood and
there was blood on Tai's hand when he drew it away from his back (R. 193:52, 65-67).
Hanna looked back to see how Tai was, heard him say he had been stabbed, and
noticed blood for the first time (R. 193:91-92, 106). She renewed her yelling at
defendant, asking why he had done it (R. 193:52, 92, 106). She noticed the handle of a
knife and a glint of silver in defendant's hand (R. 193:107-08, 112). Despite the arms
holding him back, defendant managed to free the hand holding the knife and hit Hanna
across the jaw with the handle (R. 193:48, 50, 92, 107-08).
Tai started to make his way toward his car, yelling that he had been stabbed (R.
193:80). Vu and Jon put him in his car and took him to the nearest hospital (R. 193:52-53,
117-18). However, the severity of the wound required that he be transferred to the
University of Utah Hospital where he remained for at least nine days, requiring surgery
and numerous stitches (R. 193:53-54; 151-52, 155, 157, 176). The knife went through his
chest cavity and a lung, then punctured his diaphragm (R. 193:155). It resulted in
damage to Tai's lungs, prolonged trouble breathing, and a reduction in his ability to be
physically active (R. 193:53-54).2 The medical expert opined that without medical
treatment, Tai likely would have died (R. 193:156-57).

2

Tai was admitted to the University of Utah Hospital under an alias for his
protection (R. 193:151-52, 158, 176).
6

Nine days later, Detective Alan Call had Hanna look at a photo array of six
pictures (R. 193:94, 128-29). She positively identified defendant's photograph (R.
193:94). She thereafter identified him at the preliminary hearing and at trial (R. 190:7;
193:88). She had no doubt about her identification, not only because of the tattoo of a
question mark defendant sported on his forehead3, but because she was familiar with
defendant before the stabbing occurred (R. 193:88-89, 96-97). She had seen him twice at
Ha Vi before the night of the stabbing (R. 193:88), had exchanged phone numbers with
him (R. 193:88-89), and had seen him one or two weeks before the stabbing when both
were at a local mall (R. 193: 89). She also noticed him earlier in Ha Vi the night of the
stabbing (R. 193:96).
Tai looked at the photo array while he was in the hospital and chose defendant and
a second person as possible matches to his assailant, telling Detective Call that his
attacker had a tattoo of a question mark on his forehead (R. 193:62-63, 127-28). Tai
positively identified defendant at both the preliminary hearing and trial (R. 190:29; 193:
42-43).
Vu Tran reported that he had seen defendant near Ha Vi before the stabbing, gave
the police a description of defendant, including his tattoo, and later identified defendant at
trial (R. 193:116-17, 119,121).

defendant's tattoo was visible from fifteen to eighteen feet away (R. 193:111-12).
7

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Point I: This Court should not review defendant's claim of plain error in the trial
court's concession to use defendant's non-certified interpreter for one of defendant's
witnesses because defendant invited any error. Defendant informed the court at the time
he called his final witness on the second day of trial about the need for an interpreter and
simultaneously offered the interpreter of his choice-a friend of defendant's family who
had interpreted in other unrelated official proceedings but was not officially certified.
Defendant thereafter failed to alert the trial court to any alleged problem with the
interpreter's performance. In any event, defendant fails to establish that the trial court's
acceptance of the proffered interpreter amounted to plain error, especially where
defendant establishes no harm from the interpreter's performance.
Point II: The prosecutor's comments in his closing arguments concerning the
tattoo of a question mark on defendant's forehead did not constitute plain error. The
remarks made in his initial closing argument-asking the jury to consider the likelihood of
there being someone else at the same club on the same night who matched defendant's
physical description and had the same tattoo in the middle of his forehead-were a
reasonable deduction from the evidence adduced at trial and the defense that someone
besides defendant must have committed the crimes. The comment made in the
prosecutor's rebuttal argument-that defendant is likely to be the only person "in this
society" having a tattoo in the middle of his forehead-might technically constitute error to
8

the extent it reflected the prosecutor's opinion of a fact not in evidence, but was not plain
when taken in the context of the parties' arguments. Further, the evidence against
defendant in this case was very compelling, leaving no reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result absent the prosecutor's rebuttal remarks.
Point III: Defendant fails to establish either deficient performance or prejudice to
prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Counsel's failure to object
to the prosecutor's rebuttal remarks in closing can be readily attributed to reasonable trial
strategy. Moreover, had he objected and the trial court issued a curative instruction, a
different outcome is not reasonably probable given the strength of the evidence.
Point IV: Defendant's claims of error are unfounded as there were no errors or,
alternatively, any error was harmless. Defendant's conviction resulted from strong
incriminating evidence, not cumulative error. Hence, his cumulative error claim fails.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF
PLAIN ERROR IN THE USE OF A NON-CERTIFIED INTERPRETER
FOR ONE OF DEFENDANT'S WITNESSES BECAUSE DEFENDANT
INVITED ANY ERROR WHICH OCCURRED; FURTHER, DEFENDANT
ESTABLISHES NEITHER ERROR NOR HARM IN THE USE OF THE
INTERPRETER
Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error in permitting Tarn
Huynh to interpret the testimony of defendant's sister, Tran Nguyen, without complying

9

with the requirements of rule 3-306, Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Br. of Aplt. at
9-21. He contends that Huynh is a non-certified, non-qualified interpreter who may
possibly have hindered defendant's ability to present a defense and may have impacted on
Ms. Nguyen's credibility. Id. However, defendant's argument fails under the facts of this
case.
On the second day of trial, as defendant called his final witness to the stand, he
informed the court for the first time that the witness would need an interpreter:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL] We would call Tran Nguyen [as a witness]. And,
your Honor, she does not speak English. I do have an interpreter presents [sic] to
translate her testimony.
THE COURT: Very well. Let's have your interpreter come forward and
take the oath.
Has this person been certified? To your knowledge, [defense counsel], has
the interpreter been certified?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL (to interpreter)] Have you been certified?
MR. HUYNH: Actually, we don't have such vocation in Utah, but I do
perform vocation in front of the Industrial Commission.
THE COURT: I mean through the administrative office of the courts. But
apparently not.
Your name, sir?
MR. HUYNH: Tarn, T-A-M, and the last name is spelled H-U-Y-N-H.
THE COURT: Will you, sir, please raise your right hand and take the oath
of interpreter?

10

(R. 162-63). Huynh took the oath, after which the prosecutor sought a bench conference.
The record then reflects the following:
THE COURT: Go ahead, [defense counsel], as a result of our bench
conference, I believe you're prepared to make a statement for the jury.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]

That's correct, your Honor.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I want to advise you in advance of
questioning Ms. Nguyen, that Tom [sic], who's the interpreter, is a friend of Ms.
Nguyen's family. That includes the defendant, Mr. Minh Ha. He has been present
during the trial. He was present during the preliminary hearing that we had in this
case and has been present throughout the various court proceedings that have
brought us to trial today.
(R. 163-64) (this exchange and the entirety of Ms. Nguyen's testimony is attached in
Add. B).
A.

Because Defendant Invited The Alleged Error Below, This Court Should Not
Review His Claim On Appeal
Defendant argues plain error on appeal because his trial counsel did not object to

the use of Huynh as an interpreter for Ms. Nguyen.4 However, defense counsel did more
than simply remain silent when Huynh took the interpreter's oath: he offered Huynh to
the court as his interpreter of choice. Moreover, the exchange suggests he did so without
knowing whether Huynh was certified, and he showed no concern when, finding him to
be uncertified, the court permitted Huynh to take the oath and interpret the testimony.

4

Defendant does not challenge his counsel's failure to object as ineffective
assistance.
11

Appellate courts will "not appraise all rulings objected to for the first time on
appeal under the plain error doctrine.... If a party through counsel has made a conscious
decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial court into error, we will then decline
to save that party from the error." State v. Brown. 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997)
(quoting State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1989), cert, denied. 497 U.S. 1024,
110 S. Ct. 3270 (1990)) (additional citations omitted). This avoids any possibility of
sanctioning a procedure that fosters invited error. Id.
Assuming, arguendo, any error occurred in using of Huynh to interpret, defendant
appears not only to have made a conscious decision to refrain from objecting, but also to
have affirmatively led the court into making the error. Defendant did not ask the court to
obtain an interpreter for defendant's sister prior to trial. Instead, he announced for the
first time that he needed one and had brought one when Ms. Nguyen was called to the
stand as the final defense witness on the second day of trial. Defendant's intent to use
Huynh is clear, not only from the timing of the offer of his services, but from the
admission that Huynh was present during trial and throughout the various court
proceedings leading to trial.
There are several strategic reasons defendant might want Huynh as an interpreter
and would, therefore, refrain from objecting or raising any possible barrier to his
acceptance by the court. Huynh was familiar with the case, had experience interpreting in
adversarial settings, and was a friend of both defendant and his sister, giving him the
12

ability to provide a certain comfort level or trust for them. Defendant may even have felt
that Huynh might be able to present his sister's responses in a light more favorable to the
defense.
Under the circumstances of this case, this Court should refuse to review
defendant's plain error claim to avoid fostering invited error. State v. Winward, 941 P.2d
627, 635 (Utah App. 1997) (a strategic decision not to object forecloses appellate review
of the alleged error even under the plain error doctrine).
B.

Defendant Fails To Make The Requisite Showing Of Plain Error, Defeating
His Claim
In the event this Court addresses the merits of defendant's claim, it must do so

under the plain error doctrine. Generally, the choice of an interpreter is reviewed on
appeal under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Fung, 907 P.2d 1192, 1194 (Utah
App. 1995). Moreover, defendant has the burden to show that he was '"somehow denied
a fair trial by the interpreter's deficiencies.'" Fung, 907 P.2d at 1194 (quoting State v.
Mendoza. 181 Ariz. 472, 891 P.2d 939, 942 (Az. App. 1995)).
However, because defense counsel below registered no objection to the
prosecutor's comments, defendant argues plain error on appeal. To establish plain error,
defendant must show that an error occurred, that it should have been obvious to the trial
court, and that it was harmful. State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 318 (Utah 1998); State v.
Finlavson. 956 P.2d 283, 292 (Utah App. 1998), cert, granted (Oct. 10, 1998). Where a
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defendant fails to establish harm, the appellate court need not reach the other elements of
the plain error analysis. Marvin. 964 P.2d at 318; Finlavson, 956 P.2d at 292.
1. No error occurred in the use of defendant's chosen interpreter
Defendant argues that the trial court's failure to expressly comply on the record
with each of the requirements of rule 3-306, Utah Code of Judicial Administration,
constitutes error (a copy of the rule is attached in Add. C). Br. of Aplt. at 13-16.
However, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court's acceptance of the
proffered interpreter was not erroneous.
While the trial judge did not verbally walk through the requirements of rule 3-306
before permitting Huynh to interpret for Ms. Nguyen, he arguably met the basic requirements for appointing Huynh as a qualified interpreter. Under rule 3-306(6)(B),
qualified interpreters may be used within the following guidelines:
(B) Qualified interpreters.
(i) Standards for appointment. A qualified interpreter may be appointed
only under the following circumstances:
(a) if there is no certification program established under subparagraph (4)
for interpreters in the language for which an interpreter is needed,
(b) if there is a certification program established under subsection (4), but
no certified interpreter is reasonably available, or
(c) for juvenile probation conferences, if the probation officer does not
speak a language understood by juvenile.
(ii) Procedure for appointment. Before appointing a qualified interpreter,
the appointing authority or delegate shall:
(a) evaluate the totality of the circumstances including the gravity of the
judicial proceeding and the potential penalty or consequence to the accused person
involved,
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(b) qualify the prospective interpreter by asking questions as to the
following matters in an effort to determine whether the interpreter has a minimum
level of qualification: (1) whether the prospective interpreter appears to have
adequate language skills, knowledge of interpreting techniques and familiarity
with interpreting in a court or administrative hearing setting; and (2) whether the
prospective interpreter has read, understands, and agrees to comply with the code
of professional responsibility for court interpreters set forth in appendix H.
Add. C.
On this record, Huynh met the standard for appointment under subsection
(B)(i)(b). First, the trial judge's questions to Huynh suggest that a certification program
exists through the administrative office of the courts (R. 193:162). Second, the manner
and timing with which defendant informed the court of the need for an interpreter for Ms.
Nguyen foreclosed the possibility of obtaining a certified interpreter without delaying the
proceedings. Nguyen was defendant's last witness in the second day of a two-day trial.
The only other interpreter immediately available without causing a delay was defendant's
own court-appointed interpreter, Tony Ngo. However, the practical difficulties in having
the same person interpret for a testifying witness and still interpret all objections and
other important in-court commentary for defendant in the process renders use of
defendant's interpreter impractical.5
5

This same analysis would support the use of Huynh as a non-certified, nonqualified interpreter under subsection (6)(C): MA non-certified, non-qualified interpreter
may be appointed when a certified or qualified interpreter is not reasonably available . . .
." Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 3-306. Add. C.
Moreover, contrary to defendant's assertion (Br. of Aplt. at 12), even if Huynh was
non-certified and non-qualified, he would still be required to comply with the Code of
Professional Responsibility for Court Interpreters. Utah R. Evid. 604 (noting, without
15

The record also reflects that the trial judge sufficiently complied with subsections
(B)(ii)(a) and (b) to permit Huynh to be used as a qualified interpreter under the rule. An
evaluation of the totality of the circumstances of the case does not expressly appear on the
record, but would have been readily apparent to the trial judge and could not have been
far from his mind in dealing with an unexpected development regarding the final defense
witness in a two-day trial dealing with felony and misdemeanor assault charges. Also
readily apparent to the court would have been the fact that defendant himself was offering
what defendant believed was a viable solution to the problem-a separate interpreter of his
choice.
While the trial court's questioning of Huynh was limited, the court was still able to
determine whether the interpreter had a "minimum level of qualification" as is required
for subsection (b). Huynh did not speak broken English and responded to the court's two
questions appropriately (R. 193:162-63). Add. B. He not only was familiar with

qualification, that interpreters are "subject to the provisions of the[] rules relating to . . .
the administration of an oath or affirmation to make a true translation"); Utah Code Jud.
Admin. R. 3-306(8) (after discussing appointment of certified, non-certified, qualified,
and non-qualified interpreters and allowing for appointment of non-certified and nonqualified interpreters, providing that "All interpreters, before commencing their duties,
shall take an oath that they will make a true and impartial interpretation using their best
skills and judgment in accordance with the Code of Professional Responsibility")
(emphasis added); Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 3-306(9)(D) (permitting a trial judge to
remove any interpreter for "failing to follow... standards prescribed by law and the Code
of Professional Responsibility...."); Code of Professional Responsibility for Court
Interpreters (Introduction) (noting that the Code is binding upon all persons who deliver
interpreting services to the judiciary).
16

interpreting in an administrative hearing setting but had actually done so before the
Industrial Commission, apparently on an on-going basis (R. 193:162). Add. B. Whether
Huynh knew of and agreed to comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility for
Court Interpreters was apparent not only in his taking of the oath swearing to abide by the
code but in his active practice before the Industrial Commission where the same
adherence to the code would be required. Huynh was not only a family friend of
defendant, but had attended all previous court hearings in this case, making him familiar
with the facts and the court proceedings. The trial court's acceptance of the proffered
interpreter suggests that he was satisfied as to Huynh's minimum level of qualification,
and that qualification was reinforced through the subsequent examination of Ms. Nguyen.
The record reveals no hesitation or difficulties on Huynh's part in interpreting either the
English or the Vietnamese, and no one questioned his interpretations or voiced any
uncertainty over any part of the exchange. Add. B.
2. Assuming error, it was not obvious to the trial court
Even assuming the trial court erred in failing to strictly and expressly verbalize
each of the requirements of rule 3-306, the error would not necessarily have been obvious
to the court. Under the circumstances of this case, where many of the considerations
behind use of an interpreter were readily apparent to the trial judge and defendant himself
offered the interpreter ultimately used, the trial judge may reasonably have determined
that defendant's apparent strategy was more important than the strict requirements of rule
17

3-306, so long as the proffered interpreter had some experience interpreting judicial or
administrative actions. Moreover, there was the added safeguard in this case of having a
certified, qualified interpreter in the courtroom throughout the witness' testimony-Tony
Ngo. Any possible concern the court might harbor at that point was necessarily
minimized as Ms. Nguyen gave her testimony and no one gave any indication of a
problem or concern about the translations. Under these circumstances, any error in the
trial court's use of defendant's chosen interpreter would not constitute plain error.
3. No reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome exists absent the
alleged error
Regardless of the trial court's compliance with rule 3-306, defendant's claim of
error fails because he does not establish that there would have been a more favorable
outcome had the court appointed a certified interpreter. See Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d
1251, 1254-55 (Utah 1997) (when a trial court errs in failing to comply with a
requirement under the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, reversal is warranted only
where the error is harmful, i.e. there is a reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome
of the case). Defendant speculates that a certified interpreter might have "accurately"
translated Ms. Nguyen's testimony, thereby possibly persuading the jury to credit her
testimony over the State's witnesses. Br. of Aplt. at 21. However, nothing in the record
suggests that Ms. Nguyen's testimony was improperly interpreted in any respect by
Huynh, highlighting the speculative nature of defendant's claim of prejudice. Moreover,
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defendant fails to provide any example in which Ms. Nguyen did not in fact say what the
interpreter credited to her,

testimony was inaccurately translated

r

^ However, defendant's court-appointed

interpreter, who is fluent in English and Vietnamese, heard the entirety of Nguyen's
testimony as stated by Ms Nguyen and as interpreted by Huynh. I le was in the best
pc sitic i 1 to judge tt le ace . .

..^

i

' ~ bic interpretation or to alert defense
counsel or the trial judge to any alleged problem. He failed io do so. At no time was
there a concern raised b> an\ one in the courtroom about Uuynh's translations, 6 and the
record reflects no uncertain!;. ...;,:..:
I ilu'u i«ii ildVmlf'

]

...., ,

* ' —*

appeal t :) identify any irregi llarity 3i*

deficiency in the interpretation which might arguably have harmed him, but he fails to do
''Defendant notes that during M s . 1 4"guy en's testimoi ly, the tn
•: -- --.
mentioned "language barriers and communication problems." Br. 01 s\-t _i. at " However.
the court was responding to objections that defense counsel was asking leading questions,
and the court merely explained that because of the need for an interpreter and the related
need of "trying to communicate with these people" he was going to be lenient and permit
such questioning (R. 193:166, 168). Add. C This clearly encompasses the general fact
that both defendant and his sister-the only witnesses for the defense-spoke little English
and required interpreters, and does not suggest that there is any problem with the manner
or content of Huynh's performance. In fact, the majority of the witnesses in this case
spoke a language other than English as their primary, if not only, language: defendant and
his sister spoke Vietnamese only (R, 193:136, 162-63); Tai spoke Cantonese and English
<k. I c ^ 41); Hanna spoke Korean and English (R. 193:85); Vu spoke Vietnamese and
_ NhfR n ^ M3).
19

so. Consequently, he has not met his burden of establishing error in Huynh's
performance, and his claim should fail.7 Marvin, 964 P.2d at 318 (where no harm is
established, a plain error claim necessarily fails).
Accordingly, whether reviewed under the invited error doctrine or the plain error
doctrine, defendant is not entitled to reversal based on the trial court's acceptance of
defendant's proffered interpreter.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S PLAIN ERROR CLAIM FAILS WHERE THE
PROSECUTOR'S INITIAL REMARKS IN CLOSING WERE
REASONABLE INFERENCES FROM THE EVIDENCE, AND ANY
ERROR IN THE REBUTTAL REMARKS WAS NEITHER OBVIOUS NOR
HARMFUL IN LIGHT OF THE COMPELLING EVIDENCE AGAINST
DEFENDANT
A.

Background And Claim
Defendant claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by making statements

that were neither supported by the evidence nor objected to by defense counsel. Br. of
Aplt. at 22-28. This claim stems from comments made by the parties in their closing
arguments below. In his initial closing remarks, the prosecutor argued that Tai Luu and
Hanna Kim were not mistaken about their identification of the perpetrator (R. 193:18183). He noted that they gave similar descriptions based on their own knowledge and their

7

Defendant also notes that Ms. Nguyen did not testify in complete compliance with
defense counsel's opening statement. Br. of Aplt. at 20. However, nothing in the record
supports defendant's suggestion that this was the fault of the interpreter.
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individual opportunities to see him,, as w^ell as on, the single factor which "distinguishes
;..-;: :; >m many other people| |

llic Lttl llial lie litij a qui,1 linn iihitk latlnnul mi In

3SECUTOR] Tattoos in, today's society, ladies and gentlemen as I'm
you realize, are very common. A, lot of people are having tattoos these days.
of a question mark in the middle of one's forehead is unique [sic].. That
distinguishes yourself from many other people.

the stabber had a tattoo of a que^..-:. .nark in the im_:e of his iorehead, and I'm
sure, as you're sitting there in the jury, you can look at Mr. Ha and see that he does
have, in fact, a tattoo of a question, mark, in, the middle of his forehead. And the
tion becomes how many people that were Asian, about five five. 120 pounds,
:
a tattoo of a question mark would have been at the club on May 19th, 1996?
;sible people would that include?
When you consider the ,.
• *•• :; io a \ cr>
small small number. In fact, it i _. r ,^, iv
u ^ . i v ouid be Ha Minh
— or Minh Ha, I'm sorry. For those who are n... cians, and I certainly am
not, maybe some of you are. but think of the mathematical probability that a
p 21 soi l who's five five, 120 pounds and Asian, would ha\e a question mai:
tattooed in the middle of their foreh. ' Think of the number of people that might
include. It could be very small. But then consider how many people would be
Asian five five, 120 [pounds], male, a tattoo with a question mark in the middle of
your forehead,, and be at tf».- *Mi s on May 1,9th That groi lp becomes even, smaller.
(R. 193:183-84) (in Add. D). The prosecutor then went into detail about the other
reasons behind the witnesses' ability to identify defendant aside from the tattoo (R.

D = fense counsel, registered no objection, but chose instead to address the remarks
in his own closing argument. He first pointed out that, as defense counsel, he was not
required to prove anything (R. 193:188) (in Add. D^ He then explained in detail why the
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eyewitness identification testimony was wholly unreliable, urging the jury to look
carefully at the jury instruction which noted that such testimony should be reviewed
carefully (R. 193:190-91). Add. D. Finally, he argued:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL] The prosecutor has asked me and has asked you to
deal in possibilities, mathematical possibilities, regarding the likelihood of an
Asian with a tattoo in the middle of his forehead being present at a certain time and
place. He's asking you to deal in possibilities. This is not proof. This is not
proof, let alone proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It's speculation.
(R. 193:195). Add. D. He went on to emphasize that the correct review of the evidence
revealed that the State's case Mis rife with reasonable doubt'1 throughout, and closed with
a reminder that the State, not defendant, had the burden of proof and that it was not met
here(R. 193:195-96). Add. D.
In rebuttal, the prosecutor again emphasized the bases for the identification
testimony from both Tai Luu and Hanna Kim (R. 193:198-99) (in Add. D). He then
addressed the tattoo as follows:
[PROSECUTOR] I'm not talking about possibilities. I'm simply talking
about reasonable conclusions from the evidence. I'm not asking you to speculate.
I'm asking you to take the facts, the evidence, decide what the facts are, and then
draw some reasonable inferences from those facts, and the instructions ask you to
do that.
So I go back to the question, how many people are going to have a tattoo in
the middle of their forehead, in this society? There isn't going to be anyone but
the defendant. That's how he's identified, and there might be a mistake about his
height, his weight, his hair style, but it's unmistakable about the tattoo in the
middle of his forehead.
(R. 193:199). Add. D.
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Because defense counsel below registered :\^ V L J ^ L . . to the prosecutor ""s
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must show that an error occurred, that it should have been obvious to the trial court, and
that it was harmful. State v. Palmer. 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah App.) (citing State v. Dunn,
850 I ~i\ ilhi, iJOc i Utah iv93)V cert, denied, 86b i\_u °> • tan i r):).
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offered at trial to support the prosecutor's claim that, statistical!) , defei idant is the only
person in socieU with a tattoo of a question mark on his forehead.8 Br of Aplt. at 22, 25.
He argues that the error should have been obv ious to a^ u i, ^^uri i\,uuSc nic juuge naa

iwuidrks, defendant argues, then it was necessarily obvious during the prosecutor's
rebuttal remarks because defense counsel had pointed out the deficiency in the evidence,
alter - • iVh wie prosecutor reiterated i,u u.,v.wuiy unsupported remL. u

8

u.;:: ^rcaier

Defendant also faun^ itic fM UMIH
au a m [dciciiuanij is
T
innocent, I'm sure his l a ^
^
*
_\ e a great explanation as to
why the stabber and his
ne same location.'1 (R.
193:186). Br. of Aplt. at 23 Defense counsel clearly addressed this point in his own
closing argument, emphasizing that the State, not dt
carried the burden of proof
and that defendant need not prove anything (R. 193
. ^5-96) Further, the jut*)
was instructed several times about
Mate's burden of
proof (R 74, 77 90-92. 94 o - ]Q
. .. ;c ? 195
,
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served to unfairly bolster the credibility of the eyewitness identification testimony. Id. at
23, 25-28.
An appellate court will reverse on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct only if
defendant establishes that: [1] "'the actions or remarks of [prosecuting] counsel call to the
attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its
verdict and, if so, [2] under the circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is
substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence,
there would have been a more favorable r e s u l t . . . . ' " State v. Longshaw. 961 P.2d 925,
928 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Cummins. 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 1992),
cert, denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993)) (additional quotations omitted). The evidence is
to be viewed in light of the totality of evidence presented at trial. Longshaw. 96 P.2d at
927; Cummins. 839 P.2d at 852. Moreover, counsel on both sides are given considerable
latitude in their closing arguments. State v. Day. 815 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Utah App. 1991).
"They have the right to fully discuss from their perspective the evidence and all
inferences and deductions it supports." State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah
1989); see also Day. 815 P.2d at 1350. However, because defendant's claim of
prosecutorial misconduct was not raised below, it is reviewed here for plain error.
Cummins. 839 P.2d at 854-57.
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remarks as defendant fails to establish the requisite plain error.
Ba

The Initial Remarks Were Reasonable Deductions From The Evidence, And
Any Error In The Remarks Was Not Obvious To The Trial Court In Light Of
Defense Counsel's Apparent Strategy To Use The Comments To His
Advantage In His Closing Argument
I In1 i n n n l s in nli. ill ii liuj; I lie \mr a ul in"
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reversal as they did not amount to error. Defendant's claim that the prosecutor urged the
jury to undertake a statistical review of the odds of someone else having the same tattoo,
without offering statistical cnueiicw in support thereof, is an overstatement. Ihe
piostn nihil s ri.Mn.irI* \

n -Jo'iintl ,ts iiiiigiin» lln pn \ 1 nsn r n m i n o n

sense in weighing the defense suggestion that someone else i nust have wielded the knife
against the consistent physical descriptions of the attacker given by three of the State's
witnesses, including tn^;: u^un.iiuus uescripuon . . ..

.:,,, . ™i.

,L pro-L.

tattoos are very common these days, then pointed out the uniqueness of a tattoo of a
question mark in the middle of a forehead (R. 193:183). Add D. Then, three times in
short succession tin: pioseajiui" expitissh pniulereiJ (tin ii.irm

like In In n,i n f s o m e i mie

who not only sported the same unique tattoo in the same spot as defendant, but was also
Asian, five feet five inches tall, and weighed 120 pounds-like defendant-being at the
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same club on the same night the stabbing occurred. Defense counsel expressly noted the
narrow focus of the prosecutor's comments when he repeated them in his own closing
remarks (R. 193:199). Add. D. When appropriately put in context, the prosecutor's
initial remarks did not seek to put before the jury formal statistical information. Nor did
the comments ask the jury to believe that defendant was the only person in existence with
this tattoo on his forehead. To the contrary, the prosecutor allowed for the possibility that
there might be someone else with the unique tattoo by noting that there might be a "small
number" of people fitting that description and that the number "might" be as small as one
(R. 193:183). Add. D.
Instead, the prosecutor's remarks are a logical interpretation of the evidence from
the prosecution's perspective and demonstrate for the jury the implausibility of the
defense. The comments did not suggest that the jury convict defendant based on statistical
evidence never adduced at trial. See State v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986)
(urging the jury to convict defendants for reasons other than the evidence adduced at
trial). The remarks were a reasonable deduction from the strong, consistent descriptions
and identification testimony provided by three of the State's witnesses, defendant's
description of his own height and weight, and defendant's "mistaken identity" defense.
As such, they were acceptable closing argument and did not impermissibly bolster the
credibility of the State's witnesses. See Cummins, 839 P.2d at 854 & n.15 (a prosecutor
can comment on witness credibility to the extent the comment is a reasonable inference
26
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In any event, any error in the initial remarks was not so obvious to the trial court as
to constitute plain error under the second prong of the plain error test, The trial court
must allow for reasonable inferences and deductions madv .
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statements "must be conducted in light of the realities of the proceedings, and must take
into account each part) *s strategy and the theon >,T the case " n "mmins, 839 P.2d at 857.
On then A.I^. uiv remarks appear to tx > , ; mat: a reason,..... ^euuv.
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mistaken identity defense by asking the jurors simply to use common sense when
considering it, The fact that defense counsel did not voice an objection would reasonably
suggest to the court that counsel might hav e had a strategic reason U r ...:> ^icncw
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own closing argument. He went on to use the prosecutor's comments to support his
w;iment

that the State had failed to meet its burden of establishing guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt, arguing that there \\a;, no snt^ >( < •' "I

" "'jciiaiiu 1 possihIilu.H 'I

prost/i uli ir smii'hl li hnin1* flic jur\r consider, and that the prosecutor's speculative
argument was one of a number of examples of howr the State had failed to establish its
case by proof beyond a reasonable doubt (R, 193:189-96^
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i D It was reasonable in

this case for the trial court to refrain from commenting on the prosecutor's remarks, first,
because they were a permissible inference from the evidence and theories produced at
trial, and second, in deference to defense counsel's strategy not to object but to use the
comments to defendant's benefit. See Cummins, 839 P.2d at 857. Accordingly, the trial
court's failure to sua sponte act to mitigate any effects of the prosecutor's initial remarks
did not amount to plain error. Id,
C.

Any Error In The Rebuttal Remarks Was Not Obvious To The Trial Court
And Was Not Prejudicial In Light Of The Compelling Evidence Against
Defendant
Additionally, defendant argues that even if defense counsel's comments in his own

closing argument served to ameliorate the effect of the prosecutor's initial comments, the
additional remarks made in the prosecutor's rebuttal argument were made "with greater
conviction and authority[,]" essentially reinforcing the original error. Br. of Aplt. at 26.
As a preliminary matter, the written record does not reflect that the rebuttal
remarks were any "stronger" or were made with any more conviction than the original
remarks, despite defendant's repeated assertion of such. I d at 23, 25-26. The prosecutor
made the remarks and moved on, and any embellishment, either physically or verbally,
which would suggest he spoke with "greater conviction" is mere speculation.
In rebuttal, the prosecutor slightly rephrased the remarks, giving his own
determination that "there isn't going to be anyone" but defendant likely to have a tattoo in
the middle of their forehead (R. 193:199). Add. D. To the extent the comment may be

28

improv idcnuy pnrasea ^ *;;e prosecutor ,<> upmiuii I .1 l.ii I 11 1 111 '\ itkiitc, i( 1 nii'1,1
;

Mir:^;, -

> nment b^

osecutor during closing

argument that the jury consider matters outside the evidence is prosecutorial
misconduct."); see also State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483,, 486 (Utah 1984) (calling attention to
a fact not in evidence constitutes misconduct).
v;,:.iv:
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context of the closing arguments. The prosecutor first properly explained the basis for his
initial remarks, explaining that they were reasonable conclusions from the evidence (R.

focused on the detailed original remarks, made not once but three times in the
prosecutor's initial closing argument V ^hile the prosecutor's brief restatement omitted
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: cutor hau aiicduv put across, and

was reasonably likely to take his rebuttal remarks in the same light
Regardless, there is no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result absent the
* * .*.

conduct or remark will not be presumed prejudicial." T roy, 688 P.2d at 486 (citation
omitted). In cases where the proof is less compelling, "this Court: will more closely
MM nfinize the conduct," Id. The evidence against defendant in this case was very
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compelling, despite defendant's attempt to portray it as weak, and the rebuttal remarks
were not so inflammatory as to change the outcome of the trial. The proper and
admissible testimony in this trial about defendant's identity was extensive and so much
more weighty than the prosecutor's remark that it is difficult to see how the remark could
have done much harm.9
Without the rebuttal comment, the jury had three eyewitnesses who identified
defendant in court, described his physical appearance as well as his unique tattoo, and put
him at the Ha Vi the night of the stabbing. While the jury was instructed at length about
the need to review eyewitness identification testimony with caution (R. 90-92-jury instr.
20), the eyewitness testimony was sufficiently strong to support the jury's verdict
independent of the challenged rebuttal comments from the prosecutor.
Hanna Kim had seen defendant before May 19, had exchanged greetings and
phone numbers with him (R. 193:88-89, 96). The night of the stabbing, she saw him at
Ha Vi before she left (R. 193:96). During the stabbing incident, Hanna stood within an
arms length of defendant, looking him in the face and yelling directly at him while others
held him back (R. 193:48, 50, 52, 91, 92, 103, 105-08, 117). She later positively
identified his photo from an array of six photos shown to her by police (R. 193:94). She
consistently and positively identified him at all opportunities since the stabbing, including
9

Moreover, the jury was informed numerous times both verbally and in writing that
it was to rely solely on the evidence and that statements by counsel were not considered
evidence (R. 75, 78, 88; 193:19, 30-32, 179-80, 195-96).
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the preliminary hearing and the trial (R, 190:7; 193:88), and she was familiar with his
tattoo |K. ivi:vz, i l l i^),
\ib u -

He first saw him

before he realized he had been stabbed. He was able to see defendant when he turned to
look over his shoulder while at his ear and while he ran from,,, him, with his body half
turned to watch defendant' s progress (R 193:45, 48 1 9, 101 02) I le • v 'as later able t o
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t>ehead R.

193:62-63, 127 ~i,. While defendant was not the only individual Tai chose as a, possible
suspect from a six-photo array, Tai positively identified defendant at both the preliminary
hearing and ti Midi. Illl>lJ:J9, l"lij,4^4 J, oJ-oJ, L!/"^8>.
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-*• w:i-: ir* more than a fight,

and, as a spectator, was able to view the participants without the added emotion of the
' v*bing (R. 193:115-17), His identification of defendant in court was positive, based not
only

^

R.
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The defense adduced evidence that defendant could not remember being at Ha Vi
in May, that he was either elsewhere in tl le Salt Lake area, or working iii i ^Ada. anu mat
' * |sngs
d<. 193.136-40, 147). His sister believed he was in the Salt Lake area during May 1996

but did not go to Ha Vi that month and was not involved in any stabbing (R. 193:165,
168, 172-73).
In addition to this evidence, the jury could properly have considered as a
reasonable inference the likelihood of someone who looked like defendant and had the
same unique tattoo in the same unique location as defendant being at Ha Vi on the night
of the stabbing.
Given the strength of this identification evidence, there is little if any likelihood of
a more favorable outcome for defendant absent the prosecutor's overbroad rebuttal
comment that no one but defendant is likely to have a tattoo on his forehead. Whether
defendant is the only person with a tattoo on his forehead, or is one of three or one of
thirty, he is still reasonably likely to be one of only a small number of people whose
tattoo is a question mark, who fits the physical description provided by the eyewitnesses,
and who would have been at the Ha Vi on May 19, 1996. As defendant has failed to
establish the requisite harm, his plain error claim fails.10

10

The same analysis applies to a review of the harmlessness of the challenged
remarks in the prosecutor's initial closing argument. In light of the strong evidence
regarding defendant's identity, there is no reasonable likelihood that, even absent the
initial remarks-which emphasized the incredibility of the defense by asking the jurors
simply to use common sense when viewing it-the jury would have acquitted defendant.
Because the prosecutor's initial remarks, read in context, sought no more than was
appropriate from the jury and resulted in no prejudice to defendant, defendant's claim of
prosecutorial misconduct must fail. Cummins. 839 P.2d at 852-53; State v. Peters, 796
P.2d 708, 712 (Utah App. 1990).
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POINT III
COUNSEL DID NOT RENDER INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
AT TRIAL WHERE REASONABLE TRIAL STRATEGY EXISTS TO
EXPLAIN HIS FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR'S
REBUTTAL CLOSING REMARKS, AND DEFENDANT FAILS TO
ESTABLISH PREJUDICE FROM HIS COUNSEL'S INACTION
DEFENSE

~ ^ndant claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he
fr :i ~i to object to the prosecutor's comments made in his rebuttal closing argument about

29-31.
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, defendant must
show "'first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable
mam.

.

e professional

ji idgment and, second, that counsel's performance pre judiced the defendant.'" State v.
t ii gu ::iles. 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996) fquotim
(Utah), cert, denied, 5L* : . . - 'wi> i L

-

n s v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521
T))

(additional quotations omitted).

counsel rendered adequate assistance. Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995).
Counsel has wide latitude to make tactical decisions, and the appellate court will not
question the decisions unless they have no reasonsx . _ ... ._dL

"Defendant apparently recognizes that his counsel's failure to object to the
prosecutor's initial closing remarks may be justified as reasonable trial strategy in light of
the use to \\ hich defense counsel put the comments in his own closing argument.

Not only must defendant establish both prongs of the test (State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d
1250, 1254 (Utah 1993)), but defendant cannot prevail on the prejudice prong unless he
proffers evidence sufficient to support "'a reasonable probability that, but for his
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'"
Arguelles, 921 P.2d at 441 (quoting Parsons, 871 P.2d at 522) (additional citations
omitted). A "reasonable probability" is defined as " ; a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.'" Id (quoting State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 187 (Utah
1990)) (additional quotations omitted).
Defendant's claim fails in this case because of his failure to meet this burden. Even
assuming this Court found any error in the rebuttal closing remark, (see Point II, supra),
defense counsel's failure to object may be wholly justified as a matter of reasonable trial
strategy. Under the circumstances of this case, defense counsel could reasonably have
chosen not to object in hopes that the prosecutor's statement that no one would have the
same tattoo would reinforce to the jury what defense counsel had argued in his earlier
closing remarks: the prosecutor was asking the jury to rely on probabilities and
possibilities unsupported by the evidence and not amounting to proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. To object and seek a curative instruction at that point also could send a message to
the jury that this comment-which, on its face, demonstrates the point made by defense
counsel in his closing argument-is different than the prosecutor's earlier proper remarks,
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and to provide a curative instruction for only the rebuttal comment might tend to reinforce
in the jury's eyes the propriety of the original remarks,

claim,,,,

I

k'fcnd.int raise* an i< • *

~ *-'•--•

counsel, "'a common standard is applicable. ' S t . .
A

_

ineffective assistance of

tz, 835 P.2d PO, 174 (Utah

— 1092) (quoting State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116 1 1?1 - 15 (Utah 1 ° ° ° ^ failure to

i r ;L

plain LI mi 11.qiiu en w mil nl pn |inln i

- -;'•-•- -uc- *
i

1U

* lv:" cl :r'm of ineffectiveness.

in ihis case, defendant failed to

blish the requisite prejudice to support his ctaiin ^\ plain jrror regarding the

prosecutor's rebuttal comments. See Point II, supra. Accordingly, his ineffective
vp M ^ ' i.

ii * . i , .

L I t i l l 11/

*.

,2

Mon , r * oLou.
. . *
.,v<. tnji :~;,
*.t *• a prosecutor' s
•ing argument dees not, a., < <> . . .
n the prejud.
t ^ d loi a claim of
'ective assistance of counsel. 1 inU\son. 956 P.2d at 29'^ As defendant notes (Br. of
at ^0), had defense counsel timeh objected, the trial o -art would have had an
»rtunity to issue a curative instruction, which is normally presumed on appeal to be
effective. Winward, 941 P.2d at 635. Consequently, the outcome is not likely to have
been different had counsel, raised an ob jection. Finlayson, 9*^ P 2d r "M^; Win ward, 941
P.2dat635.
13

Defendant also claims that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to object
because it required him to argue plain error on appeal instead of simply arguing
p i • :: 'Secutorial misconduct. Br. of Aplt. at 31 However, the harm.ful.ness requirement, for
1: • : 1:1 :i„. j: \i it I error and prosecutorial misconduct is the same. See Longshaw; 961 P.2d at
929; Pataei, 860 P.2d at 342. Here, defendant has failed to establish the requisite harm
foi his plain error claim. See Point II, supra. Accordingly, there is no reason to believ e
he would have prevailed on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, defeating his assertion
of prejudice from his inability to raise the claim. See, e.g.. State v. Gallegos. 967 P.2d

POINT IV
THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS
CASE
Defendant's final argument asserts that the cumulative effect of the errors
involving appointment of the interpreter and the prosecutor's rebuttal closing remarks
require a new trial. Br. of Aplt. at 31-32.
Under the cumulative error doctrine, this Court "will reverse only if'the
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence . .. that a fair trial was
had."1 Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1229. Because defendant has not established the existence of
multiple identifiable errors in this case, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply.
State v. Basta. 966 P.2d 260, 264 n.2 (Utah App. 1998); see also Parsons, 871 P.2d at 516
(refusing to apply the cumulative error analysis where defendant failed to establish any of
his eight claims of ineffective assistance) (citing Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 806
(Utah 1988)) (additional citations omitted).
To the extent this Court disagrees and finds both errors defendant mentions, each
of the errors constitutes harmless error, as set forth in Points I and II, supra. Defendant
does not establish that Ms. Nguyen's testimony, in any respect, was not what the
interpreter represented it to be, or that the prosecutor's rebuttal closing remarks

973 (Utah App. 1998) (counsel's failure to perform a futile act does not render his
performance ineffective); see also Parsons, 871 P.2d at 525 (where interrogation of a
witness would have been futile under the facts at hand, counsel's failure to do so did not
constitute ineffective assistance).
36

Improperly bolstered the testimony of the State's witnesses "with insupportable statistical
infon
iifnul.iiliye effeef of the harmless errors does not undermine confidence in the fairness of
the trial in light of the evidence discussed in the Statement of Facts and Point 11, supra.
Finlayson, 956 P.2d at 295 (where the issues demonstrated either no error or harmless
error, and the cumulate w c i ; ^ ; oi ;;iuse errors does not under i i lii le c :)i: lfidei ice it lat a fall
"«> i' > State \ . A n I ; A

932 P.2d 606, 617 (Utah Apr 1997), affd. 973 P.2d 975 ^Liak VJ, „).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests thai in.. L ..urt affirm
defer idai it's coi I > • icti :: i is ai id set ltei ices.
day of
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED

PARTI
ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES
76-5-102. Assault.

1998 Supplement

(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes or
creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the person causes substantial bodily
injury to another.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily
injury to another.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-102, enacted by L.
1974, ch. 32, § 38; 1989, ch. 51, § 1; 1991, ch.
75, § 3; 1995, ch. 291, § 4; 1996, ch. 140, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-

ment, effective May 1, 1995, added Subsection
(3).
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29,
1996, added Subsection (4).

REPLACEMENT VOLUME 8B
1995 EDITION

76-5-103. Aggravated assault.
Place in Pocket of Corresponding Bound Volume

Edited by
The Publisher's Editorial Staff

LEXIS
Law Publishing
Charlottesville, Virginia

(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection
(l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (1Kb) is a third degree felony
History: C. 1953, 76-5-103, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 10;
1989, ch. 170, § 2; 1995, ch. 291, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added "under
circumstances not amounting to a violation of

Subsection (lXa)" to the beginning of Subsection (1Kb); substituted "A violation of Subsection UKa)" for "Aggravated assault" and "second degree" for "third degree" in Subsection (2);
and added Subsection (3).

Addendum B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OFJttlTAH
Jua

'"tiTJOlll>T

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF
TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

-vMINH NGOC HA,
Case No. 971901046FS
Defendant,
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
ON OCTOBER 21 and 22, 1997

p *«».'-.• M l
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

CY CASTLE
Deputy District Attorney
2001 South State Street #S-3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

ALAN E. BARBER
Attorney at Law
50 West Broadway, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

ANNA M. BENNETT, CSR
31 North Acorn Drive
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054
(801)

295-6054

FILED
Utah Court of ADDeate

NOV 1 6 ]S3B
Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court

1

Gno-mia ^

REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. CASTLE:

1
2

Q.

Dr. Barton, that was the amount of blood that you

3 actually took from Mr, Lim's body?

1

That does not account for

4 blood that was lost, somewhere else, does it?
5

A.

No, this was> just what came out the chest tube

6

MR. CASTLE:

7

THE COURT:

Thank you.
Okay.

•

That's all I have.

Dr. Barton, thank you.

You 're free

8 to go, sir »
9

1

You now rest,, Mr. Castle?

10

MR. CASTLE:

11

THE COURT:

That's correct, your Honor.
All right.

You may call your next

12 witness.
13

MR. BARBER:

We would call Tran Nguyen.

14 Honor, she does not. speak English.

And, your

I do have an inte rpreter I

15 presents to translate her testimony.
16

THE COURT:

Very well.

Let's have your inte rpreter

17 come forward and take the oath.
18

Has this person been certified?

To your knowledge,

19 Mr. Barber, has the\ interpreter been certified?
20

MR. BARBER:

21

MR. HUYNH:

Have you been certified?
Actually, we don't have such vocation in

22 Utah, but I do perform vocation in front of the Indus trial
23 Commission »
24

THE COURT:

I mean through the administrative office

25 of the courts. But: apparently not.
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1

Your name, sir?

2

MR. HUYNH:

Tam, T-A-M, and the last name is spelled

3 H-U-Y-N-H.
4

THE COURT: Will you, sir, please raise your right

5 hand and take the oath of interpreter?
6

TAM HUYNH, having been duly summoned and sworn as

7 an interpreter for the Vietnamese language by and on behalf
8 of the Defendant, interpreted as follows:
9

MR. CASTLE:

Can we approach the bench?

10

THE COURT:

11

And you are Ms. Nguyen?

12

THE WITNESS:

13

THE COURT:

14

Well, let's swear the witness first.

Yes, your Honor.

Very well.

Would you take the oath?

TRAN NGUYEN, having been duly summoned and sworn as

15 a witness by and on behalf of the Defendant, took the stand
16 and testified through the interpreter as follows:
17

THE CLERK:

Please take a seat, state your name and

18 spell it.
19

THE COURT: All right, Pete we can bring the same

20 chair over.

Counsel, if you want to come up now, go ahead.

21

(Whereupon, discussion was held at the bench

22

amoung the Court and both counsel, out of the

23

hearing of the Jury and the Reporter.)

24

THE COURT:

Go ahead, Mr. Barber, as a result of our

25 bench conference, I believe you're prepared to make a
163

1 statement for the jury.
2

MR. BARBER:

That's correct, your Honor.

3

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I want to advise you

4 in advance of questioning Ms. Nguyen, that Tom, who's the
5 interpreter, is a friend of Ms. Nguyen's family.
6 includes the defendant, Mr. Minh Ha.
7 during the trial.

That

He has been present

He was present during the preliminary

8 hearing that we had in this case and has been present
9 throughout the various court proceedings that have brought us
10 to trial today.
THE COURT:

11

All right, Mr. Barber.

Thank you.

You

12 may now examine the witness, Mr. Barber, if you wish.
MR. BARBER:

13
14

Thank you.

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BARBER:

15

Q.

Would you please state your name and address?

16

A.

Nguyen Tran.

17

Q.

And would you spell that?

18

A.

N-G-U-Y-E-N.

19

Q.

And how would you prefer that I address you?

20

A.

Tran.

21

Q.

Tran, is that okay?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Tran, are you related to the defendant, Minh Ha?

24

A.

I am his sister.

25

Q.

Are you older or younger than Minh?

Tran is T-R-A-N.
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1

A.

Older.

2

Q.

By how many years?

3

A.

Three years.

4

Q.

Did Minh live with you in your home for a time?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Approximately what period of time did he reside with

7 you?
8

A.

Until —

I mean, from his separation with his

9 lex-girlfriend, he moved out and lived with me.
10

Q.

And when did he separate from his ex-girlfriend, as

11 best you can recall?
12

A.

Around February, March of 1996.

13

Q.

And how long after that time did he continue to reside

14 in your home?
15

A.

Except for the time he took off to have a job in

16 Texas>, he lived with me since then.
17

Q.

And when was it that he left to go to Texas?

18

A.

He used to left around May or June, that is the season

19 that people went out fishing in Texas.
20

Q.

Are we talking about the year 1996?

21

A.

Yes, 1996.

22

Q.

When did he return from Texas?

23

A.

Around November of 1996.

24

Q.

Did he continue to reside with you after November of

25 19967>

1
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1

A.

Yes, he lived with me.

2

Q.

Until when?

3

A.

Until around March or April of 1997 when he asked my

1

4 permission to let him go to Seattle, Washington, for wedding
5 party of one of his sister's friends.
6

Q.

Now Tran, I want you to cast your memory bac k in time

7 to the date of May 19th of 1996.
THE COURT:

8

So is there a question pending?

9

Q.

(By MR. BARBER:)

Do you remember that day?

10

A.

I can't remember exactly because usually my friend or

11 my brother went out during May every year.
MR. CASTLE:

12

Your Honor, I'm going to object

She

13 can't remember this date and has stated that. She.
14
15

THE COURT:
Q.

There's been no follow-up question.

(By MR. BARBER:)

Do you remember during the month of

16 May of 1996, what Minh's habits were?

What did he do in the

17 evenin g when he got off work?
18

A.

Not that I recall.

19

Q.

Do you recall that he ever went to a placed called the

20 Cafe H a Vi?
21

MR. CASTLE:

22

THE COURT:

Objection, your Honor, leading.
I'm going to allow that question under

23 these somewhat unusual circumstances involving the
24 interp reter and the lack of ability to communicate in a
25 common language.

Overruled.
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THE WITNESS:

1

Let me repeat what she said.

Once a

2 while Minh came to Cafe Ha Vi and one of his friends, Jon,
3 told me that he —
MR. CASTLE:

4

Objection, your Honor, hearsay, and I

5 also want to object based on foundation, unless she knows
6 personally versus hearing it.
7

THE COURT:

Well, the objection as to hearsay based on

8 what somebody told her is sustained.
9

Q.

(By MR. BARBER:)

Do you know that Minh occasionally

10 went to the Cafe Ha Vi?
11

MR. CASTLE:

Objection, your Honor, hearsay.

12 just the same question again.

This is

She was indicating it was

13 based on what someone else has told her.
14

THE COURT:

Well, I'm not sure we're at the point,

15 counsel, where we've actually gotten what she knows.

We have

16 inquired into what someone has told her, but I think the
17 question as to what she knows is a legitimate question.

I'm

18 willing to hear her answer to that question.
19

THE WITNESS:

Once a while he go to Cafe Ha Vi with

20 his friends.
21

Q.

(By MR. BARBER:)

All right.

22 came home on the evenings —

Now, Tran, when Minh

on any of the evenings that you

23 understood he had been to the Cafe Ha Vi, did you ever
24 observe anything unusual about him?
25

A.

No, he acted very normal.
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1

Q.

Did you ever have a conversation with Minh in which

2 Minh indicated that he had been in a fight?
3

MR. CASTLE:

4

THE COURT:

Objection, your Honor, hearsay.
Well, it's a leading question, but we've

5 got a probl.em here, obviously, of trying to communicate with
6 these peopJ.e.
She has testified that whenever he came home he was

7

8 norma 1.
9

J

Q.

So let's go from there.
(By MR. BARBER:)

All right.

J
Did you ever observe

f
10 blood on Mi.nh s clothing when he came from the Cafe Ha Vi?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

Did you ever observe Minh to be in an excited or an

1

13 upset state of mind?

1

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

Did Minh ever state to you in words or in substance

16 that he was> hiding from anyone?
MR. CASTLE:

17

Objection, your Honor, hearsay.

J
That is

18 self- serving.
THE COURT:

19
20

Q.

Sustained.

(By MR. BARBER:)

Did you ever see a knife in Minh's

21 possession?
22

A.

No.

23

Q.

Specifically a knife that would have had a blade

24 somewhere between seven and nine inches long?
25

A.

No.
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1

Q.

Did you ever in going through the house find any

1

2 [location where Minh had hidden clothing?
3

A.

No.

4

MR. BARBER:

5

THE COURT: All

6

MR. CASTLE:

7
8

That's all I have.
right.

Mr.

Thank you.

Castle?

Thank you, your Honor.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. CASTLE:
Q.

1

Tran, let's talk about your relationship with Minh.

9 Can we talk about that?
THE COURT: Well, do you mean you want to ask her some

10

11 .questions?

If you do, you have my permission.

Go right

j

12 ahead.
13

Q-

(By MR. CASTLE:)

Minh is your brother?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

He's a member of your family?

16

A.

Yes, that's correct.

17

Q.

You care deeply about him?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

It's —

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

You realize this stabbing we're talking about happened

you're here to help him today?

22 about a year and a half ago?
23

A.

I heard about that.

24

Q.

And you became aware that he had been arrested in May

25 of 1997, right?
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

Back in May of 1996, though, you did not have any

3 reason to remember what Minh was specifically doing that
4 month, did you?
5

A.

He didn't do anything.

6

Q.

But you did not have any reason to remember what it

7 was he was doing in May of 1996?
8

A.

Yes, but a couple of months later, I heard Jon, Minh

9 friend, told me that people suspect Minh in that incident.
10

Q.

So several months after May you were told by a police

11 officer that the police were looking for Minh?
12

A.

No, not from the police.

13

Q.

A friend told you, a friend of Minh's, that the police

14 were looking for him?
15

A.

No, but he —

his friend told me that rumor around

16 town said that Minh was a suspect in the stabbing.
17

Q.

But that happened months after May of 1996?

18

A.

Yes, that's correct.

19

Q.

So back im May of 1996 you didn't have any reason to

20 specifically remember what Minh was doing, did you?
21

A.

He didn't do anything.

22

Q.

That's not my question.

My question is, in May of

23 1996, she had no reason to specifically remember what Minh
24 was doing because it wasn't until months later that she
25 realized that Minh was in trouble.
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1

A.

That's correct, until a couple months later when I

2 heard from Jon and I called and talked to him over the phone.
3 At the time Minh was in Texas.
4

Q.

So when you heard from a friend that the police were

5 look looking for Minh, you called Minh in Texas?
6

A.

There was no police call, I just heard from Jon Minh's

7 friend.
8

Q.

When she heard that news —

when you heard that news,

9 did you call Minh in Texas and tell him about it?
10

A.

Yes, I did call him.

11

Q.

What month did you call him?

12

A.

Minh called me early August and at the end of August I

13 did call him.
14

Q.

And even though you told him the police were looking

15 for him, he stayed in Texas until November, correct?
16

MR. BARBER:

Object, your Honor, it's argumentative.

17

THE COURT:

Well, I don't think so.

18 cross-examination.
THE WITNESS:

19

It's

I think it's a fair question.
Minh stay there until November before he

20 returned to Utah.
21

Q.

(By MR. CASTLE:)

When he returned to Utah, he was

22 here for how many months?
23

A.

Another seven or eight month until he left for

24 Seattle.
25

Q.

When did he he leave for Seattle?
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1

A.

I remember around the end of March or earlier April.

1

2

Q.

So he came back in November and he left in March or

1

3 April ?

1

4

A.

Yes, he did ask me to go for about a week.

1

5

Q.

Sorry, I didn't understand that.

1

6

A.

He did ask me that he will go for a week.

1

7

Q.

So his plan was to go to Seattle and stay one week and J

8 then return?

J

9

A.

Yeah, yes, uh-huh (affirmative).

1

10

Q.

When did he leave?

1

11

A.

I can't remember the date, but it's around the end of

12 March or early April.
13

Q.

Actually, he was in Seattle much longer than one week,

14 was h e not?
15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

You indicated he came back in November of 1996 to

17 Utah?
18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Prior to that time in August you told him the police

20 were looking for him?
21

A.

I didn't tell him about the police because I didn't

22 hear about police looking for him.

I just heard that he was

23 involved in this incident from what his friends told me.
24

Q.

During the time —

what month did he leave for Texas?

25

A.

Usually he left around the end of May or early June.
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1

Q.

During the time that he was living with you, did you

2 ever go with him to the Ha Vi Cafe, or Cafe Ha Vi?
3

A.

Because I have small baby, so I never go.

1

4

Q.

So you never went with him to Ha Vi?

1

5

A.

I didn't go with him, but he always told me wherever

6 he go •
7

Q.

1

So your knowledge about him going to the Ha Vi is

8 based on what your brother Minh told you?
9

A.

Yes, whatever he did, he told me.

10

Q.

He could have gone somewhere else, though, for all you

1

11 know ]Decause you weren't there?
12

A.

That's correct, but wherever he go, he used to call me

13 and tell me that he will be home at what time.
14

Q.

15

•A.

16

Q.

Did he have a job here in in May of 1996?
He worked at the airport.
How many times did he go to the Ha Vi in April of

17 1996?
18

A.

Couple times.

19

Q.

How many times?

20

A.

Around three times.

2 1

Q.

What were the dates that he went?

22

A.

I can't remember.

23

Q.

You didn't make any notes about when said he was going

24 there or had been there, did you, in April?
25

A.

No.
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1

Q.

That would be true about May of 1996 also, wouldn't

2 it?
3

A.

I didn't hear —

he told me me went to Ha Vi at all.

4

Q.

But she didn't make any notes, written notes, about

5 the number of times Minh went to Ha Vi in May, did she?
6

A.

No.

7

Q.

Tran, was it your practice to inspect the clothes of

8 Minh when he would return from wherever he had been?
9

A.

I wash all of his clothes.

10

Q.

When you washed his clothes, were you looking for

11 things like blood?
12

A.

No.

13

Q.

At your home you have kitchen knives, do you not?

14

A.

Yes, I do.

15

Q.

You have knives that are sharp that cut meat, things

16 like that, in your home?
17

A.

Yes, I have two of them.

18

Q.

Just like every other household, right?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

And you testified earlier that you didn't —

you don't

21 know what his habits were in terms of what he did on a
22 typical day?
23

A.

He didn't have any real habit.

24 normal.
25

He just act very

He just go home and stay home.

MR. CASTLE:

That's all I have.
174

THE COURT:

1

All right.

Is there anything further,

1

2 Mr. Barber?
MR. BARBER:

3

Just a couple of questions on redirect,

J

4 your Honor.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BARBER:

1

Tran, you testified in response to Mr. Castle's

1

7 question that you had two knives in your home; is that

1

5
6

Q.

8 correct?
9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Did either of those knives ever end up missing?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

Did either of those knives ever show up with blood

1

1

13 stains on them?
14

A.

No.

15

Q.

When you were —

before you testified today, you were 1

16 placed under oath, and you understand that that oath meant
17 that you are to tell the truth?

1

18

A.

Yes, I just tell the truth.

19

Q.

Have you lied in any of your testimony to protect your

20 brother?
21

A.

No.

22

MR. BARBER:

23

THE COURT:

Nothing further.
All right.

Thank you.

If there's nothing further

24 then, you may step down, ma'am.
25

And thank you, sir, for your assistance here.
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Addendum C

Rule 3-306

Rule 3-306. Court interpreters.
Intent:
To declare the policy of the Utah State Courts to secure the rights of persons
who are unable to understand or communicate adequately in the English
language when they are involved in legal proceedings.
To outline the procedure for certification, appointment, and payment of court
interpreters.
l b provide certified interpreters in all cases in those languages for which
certification programs have been established.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to legal proceedings in the courts of record and not of
record.
This rule shall apply to interpretation for non-English speaking persons and
not to interpretation of the hearing impaired.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Definitions.
(A) "Appointing authority" means a trial judge, administrative hearing
officer or other officer authorized by law to conduct judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, or a delegate thereof.
(B) "Certified interpreter" means a person who has fulfilled the requirements set forth in subsection 4.
(C) "Qualified interpreter" means an uncertified interpreter who has been
found by the appointment authority to be qualified pursuant to subsection
6(B).
(D) "Code of Professional Responsibility" means the Code of Professional
Responsibility for Court Interpreters set forth in Appendix H.
(E) "Legal proceeding" means a civil, criminal, domestic relations, juvenile,
traffic or administrative proceeding. Legal proceeding does not include a
conference between the non-English speaking person and the interpreter that
occurs outside the courtroom, hearing room, or chambers unless ordered by the
appointing authority. In juvenile court legal proceeding includes the intake
stage.
(F) "Non-English speaking person" means any principal party in interest or
witness participating in a legal proceeding who has limited ability to speak or
understand the English language.
(G) "Principal party in interest" means a person involved in a legal proceeding who is a named party, or who will be bound by the decision or action, or who
is foreclosed from pursuing his or her rights by the decision or action which
may be taken in the proceeding.
(H) "Witness" means anyone who testifies in any legal proceeding.
(2) Advisory panel. Policies concerning court interpreters shall be developed
by a court interpreter advisory panel, appointed by the council, comprised of
judges, court staff, lawyers, court interpreters, and experts in the field of
linguistics.
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(3) Minimum performance standards. All certified and qualified interpreters serving in the court shall comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility.
(4) Certification.
(A) Subject to the availability of funding, and in consultation with the
advisory panel, the administrative office shall establish programs to certify
court interpreters in the non-English languages most frequently needed in the
courts. The administrative office shall:
(i) designate languages for certification;
(ii) establish procedures for training and testing to certify and recertify
interpreters; and
(iii) establish, maintain, and issue to all courts in the state a current
directory of certified interpreters.
(B) To become certified an interpreter shall:
(i) prior to participation in the training program, pay a fee of $100.00 to the
administrative office to offset the costs of training and testing;
(ii) complete training as required by the administrative office;
(iii) obtain a passing score on the court interpreter's test(s) as required by
the administrative office; and
(iv) comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility.
(C) An interpreter may be certified upon submission of satisfactory proof to
the advisory panel that the interpreter is certified in good standing by the
federal courts or by a state having a certification program that is equivalent to
the program established under this section.
(5) Recertification.
(A) Subject to the availability of funding, the administrative office shall
establish continuing educational requirements for maintenance of certified
status.
(B) l b maintain certified status, a certified interpreter shall:
(i) comply with continuing educational requirements as established by the
administrative office; and
(ii) comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility.
(6) Appointment.
(A) Certified interpreters. When an interpreter is requested or when the
appointing authority determines that a principal party in interest or witness
has a limited ability to understand and communicate in English, a certified
interpreter shall be appointed except under those circumstances specified in
subsection (6KB) or (C).
(B) Qualified interpreters.
(i) Standards for appointment. A qualified interpreter may be appointed
only under the following circumstances:
(a) if there is no certification program established under subparagraph (4)
for interpreters in the language for which an interpreter is needed,
(b) if there is a certification program established under subsection (4), but
no certified interpreter is reasonably available, or
(c) for juvenile probation conferences, if the probation officer does not speak
a language understood by juvenile.
(ii) Procedure for appointment. Before appointing a qualified interpreter,
the appointing authority or delegate shall:
(a) evaluate the totality of the circumstances including the gravity of the
judicial proceeding and the potential penalty or consequence to the accused
person involved,
(b) qualify the prospective interpreter by asking questions as to the following matters in an effort to determine whether the interpreter has a minimum
level of qualification:
(1) whether the prospective interpreter appears to have adequate language
skills, knowledge of interpreting techniques and familiarity with interpreting
in a court or administrative hearing setting; and
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(2) whether the prospective interpreter has read, understands, and agrees
to comply with the code of professional responsibility for court interpreters set
forth in appendix H
(in) The procedure to qualify a non certified interpreter need not recur every
time the interpreter is used Within each judicial district the names of
non certified interpreters who have been qualified by the appointing authority
pursuant to subsection (6KB) shall be placed on a list for use by the district in
cases where a certified interpreter is not reasonably available
(iv) Court employees may serve as qualified interpreters, but their service
shall be limited to short hearings that do not take them away from their
regular duties for extended periods
(C) Non qualified intetptetei A non-certified, non-qualified interpreter may
be appointed when a certified or qualified interpreter is not reasonably
available, or the court determines that the gravity of the case and potential
penalty to the accused person involved are so minor that delays attendant to
obtaining a certified or qualified interpreter are not justified
(7) Waiter
(A) A non-English speaking person may at any point in the proceeding
waive the right to the services of an interpreter, but only when
(i) the waiver is approved by the appointing authority after explaining on
the record to the non-English speaking person through an interpreter the
nature and effect of the waiver,
(n) the appointing authority determines on the record that the waiver has
been made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and
(in) the non English speaking person has been afforded the opportunity to
consult with his or her attorney
(B) At any point in any proceeding, for good cause shown, a non-English
speaking person may retract his or her waiver and request an interpreter
(8) Oath All interpreters, before commencing their duties, shall take an
oath that they will make a true and impartial interpretation using their best
skills and judgment in accordance with the Code of Professional Responsibility
(9) Removal in individual cases Any of the following actions shall be good
cause for a judge to remove an interpreter in an individual case
(A) being unable to interpret adequately, including where the interpreter
self reports such inability,
(B) knowingly and willfully making false interpretation while serving in an
official capacity,
(C) knowingly and willfully disclosing confidential or privileged information
obtained while serving in an official capacity,
(D) failing to follow other standards prescribed by law and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and
(E) failing to appear as scheduled without good cause
(10) Removal from certified or qualified list Any of the following actions
shall be good cause for a court interpreter to be removed from the certified list
maintained under subsection (4)(A)(in) or from the qualified list maintained
under subsection (6XBX111)
(A) knowingly and willfully making false interpretation while serving in an
official capacity,
(B) knowingly and willfully disclosing confidential or privileged information
obtained while serving in an official capacity,
(C) failing to follow other standards prescribed by law and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and
(D) failing to appear as scheduled without good cause
(11) Discipline The advisory panel shall review and respond to allegations
of violations of the Code of Professional Conduct, including decertification or
other disciplinary measures Interpreters being disciplined will be given notice
of the disciplinary action and an opportunity to respond

Rule 3-306
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(12) Payment
(A) Courts of tecord
(I) In courts of record, the administrative office shall pay interpreter fees
and expenses in
(a) criminal cases in which the defendant is determined to be indigent,
(b) juvenile court cases brought by the state,
(c) cases filed against the state pursuant to U R C P 65B(b) or 65C, and
(d) other cases in which the court determines that the state is obligated to
pay for an interpreter's services
(II) In all other civil cases and small claims cases, the party engaging the
services of the interpreter shall pay the interpreter fees and expenses
(III) Fees Certified court interpreters shall be paid $30 per hour Qualified
interpreters in languages for which there is no certification program shall be
paid $25 per hour Qualified interpreters in languages for which there is a
certification program shall be paid $20 per hour This section does not apply to
court employees acting as interpreters
(iv) Expenses Mileage for interpreters will be paid at the same rate as state
employees for each mile necessarily traveled in excess of 50 miles round trip
Per diem expenses will be paid at the same rate as state employees
(v) Procedure for payment The administrative office shall pay fees and
expenses of the interpreter upon receipt of a certification of appearance signed
by the clerk of the court The certification shall include the name, address and
social security number of the interpreter, the case number, the dates of
appearance, the language interpreted, and an itemized statement of the
amounts to be paid
(B) Courts not of record
(I) In courts not of record, the local government that funds the court not of
record shall pay interpreter fees and expenses in criminal cases in which the
defendant is determined to be indigent
(II) In small claims cases, the party engaging the services of the interpreter
shall pay the interpreter fees and expenses
(III) Fees The local government that funds the court not of record shall
establish the amount of the interpreter fees
(iv) Expenses The local government that funds the court not of record shall
establish interpreter expenses, if any, that will be paid
(v) Procedure for payment The local government that funds the court shall
pay the interpreter upon receipt of a certification of appearance signed by the
clerk of the court The certification shall include the name, address and social
security number of the interpreter, the case number, the dates of appearance,
the language interpreted, and an itemized statement of the amounts to be
paid
(Repealed and reenacted effective November 1, 1996, amended effective
December 13, 1996, November 1, 1998, April 1, 1999 )
R e p e a l s and R e e n a c t m e n t s — Former
Rule 3 306 relating to appointment and pay
ment of court interpreters and standards for
court interpreter service was repealed and the
present rule enacted effective November 1,
1996
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend
ment deleted "and the probation stage" from
the end of Subdivision <1KE> ldded Subdivi
sion (4 MB Mi) making related designation
changes and added Subdivision (6MBMIMC),
making related changes
The 1998 amendment deleted "because of a
non English speaking cultural background" be-

fore "to understand" in the paragraph of Intent
and substituted **staflT for "administrators" in
Subdivision (2)
The 1999 amendment rewrote Subdivision
(12M A Mm) inserting "in languages for which
there is no certification program" in the first
sentence adding the second sentence and sub
stituting the last sentence for "Court employees
acting as interpreters pursuant to (6MBMIV)
shall be paid their regular hourly rate and shall
not receive additional payment for interpreter
services "
C r o s s References. — Code of professional
responsibility for court interpreters, Appx 11
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1 had seen him on three prior occasions.

She testified that

2 she gave Minh Ha her phone number, and what do both of them
3 say about Minh Ha that distinguishes him from many other
4 people?

Is the fact that he has a question mark tattooed on

5 his forehead.
6

Tattoos in today's society, ladies and gentlemen, as

7 I'm sure you realize, are very common.
8 having tattoos these days.

A lot of people are

But of a question mark in the

9 middle of one's forehead is unique.

That distinguishes

10 yourself from many other people.
11

When you consider the evidence, recall that Tai Luu

12 and Hanna Kim said the stabber had a tattoo of a question
13 mark in the middle of his forehead, and I'm sure, as you're
14 sitting there in the jury, you can look at Mr. Ha and see
15 that he does have, in fact, a tattoo of a question mark in
16 the middle of his forehead.

And the question becomes how

17 many people that were Asian, about five five, 120 pounds,
18 with a tattoo of a question mark would have been at the club
19 on May 19th, 1996?

How many possible people would that

20 include?
21

When you consider the uniqueness of the tattoo, it

22 comes down to a very small, small number.

In fact, it might

23 just be one, and that one would be Ha Minh —
24 sorry.

or Minh Ha, I'm

For those who are mathematicians, and I certainly am

25 not, maybe some of you are, but think of the mathematical
183 |

1 probability that a person who's five five, 120 pounds and
2 Asian, would have a question mark tattooed in the middle of
3 their forehead.
4 include.

Think of the number of people that might

It could be very small.

But then consider how many

5 people would be Asian, five five, 120, male, a tattoo with a
6 question mark in the middle of your forehead, and be at the
7 club on May 19th.
8

That group becomes even smaller.

What's unique about this case is that Tai Luu and

9 Hanna Kim are basing their identification, particularly Hanna
10 Kim, on the fact that she knows him, has known him before,
11 not just based on his tattoo, but they had that additional
12 information that separates Minh Ha from everyone else in
13 terms of who it was that committed this very serious crime.
14

Now, there might be a question about whether Minh Ha

15 intended to hit Hanna Kim as she was attempting to rescue Tai
16 Luu, and ladies and gentlemen, there is another instruction
17 that was read to you that talks —

that answers this

18 question, and that is instruction number 17. When it comes
19 to an assault, an assault can occur one of three ways. One
20 can intentionally do it, one can knowingly do it, one can
21 recklessly do it.

It doesn't require the same mental state

22 as aggravated assault.
23

You'll note the instruction regarding aggravated

24 assault.

It says, "Intentionally or knowingly assaulted Tai

25 Luu."
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1 It's a privilege to be entrusted with making the kind of
2 decision that you are going to make today, the decisions that
3 affect lives of several people, not the least of whom is my
4 client, Mr. Minn Ha.
5

Now, I don't want you to think for a moment that we

6 are downplaying in any way the severity of the wound that Mr.
7 Tai Luu sustained, and I don't want you to think that we are
8 attacking him in the sense of claiming that this event never
9 happened.

It's clear, it's clear he was stabbed.

10 don't condone that kind of behavior.
11 the pale of civilized behavior.

And we

That is clearly outside

That's why we have laws, but

12 the question that confronts you, ladies and gentlemen, and
13 the question that should intrigue you, indeed, it should more
14 than intrigue you, it should dominate your thinking until you
15 have reached a verdict, is whether or not the State of Utah
16 has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of
17 the crimes of which my client is charged because, you see, as
18 defense counsel, I don't have to prove anything.

I'm not

19 required to prove a negative.
20

The Court instructed you in its instruction number 7,

21 and I hope you'll take a good look at it when you get in the
22 jury room, all presumptions independent of evidence are in
23 favor of innocence and a defendant is presumed innocent until
24 he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and in case of
25 a reasonable doubt as to whether guilt is satisfactorily
188

1 shown, he is entitled to an acquittal.
2

Now, that does not mean it's a matter of discretion.

3 That means he is entitled to be acquitted of the crimes for
4 which he is charged unless and until you, as members of the
5 jury, determine that the State of Utah has proven every
6 element of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt. I
7 hope that presumption of innocence and the phrase "reasonable
8 doubt" will resonate in your mind as you begin your
9 consideration of the evidence in this case.
10

Contrary to my colleague's argument to you, there is a

11 great deal of conflict in the State's evidence regarding what
12 what happened, regarding when it happened, regarding the
13 perpetrator.

For example, you will recall that Hanna Kim

14 identified the assailant as someone known as Richard.

But

15 aside from her testimony, there is nothing that links this
16 name Richard with Minh Ha.
17

You will recall, and as I argue, let me hand you

18 State's Exhibit Number 6 for you to look at.

You will recall

19 that Mr. Tai Luu, when presented with a photographic lineup,
20 identified one of two people who could have been the possible
21 assailants.

When you look on State's Exhibit Number 6, you

22 will see that Mr. Minh Ha who is on there, has a tattoo in
23 the middle of his forehead.

The other gentleman who was

24 identified as a possible assailant does not.
25

Now, the issue of eyewitness identification is
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1 critical to the State's case because it is all they have to
2 tie Mr. Minn Ha to this particular crime, and you need to
3 review very carefully Judge Frederick's instruction number 20
4 as to identification, eyewitness identification, because
5 eyewitness identification is not conclusive.
6 end all and be all of the case.

It is not the

As that instruction will

7 explain to you or explains to you, there are numerous factors
8 that go into determining whether an identification, an
9 eyewitness identification, especially in the heat of the
10 moment, whether that type of identification is reliable, and
11 you need to look at that instruction number 20 very
12 carefully, but let me give you a few points to assist you in
13 your analysis in instruction number 20 and the eyewitness
14 identification.
15

Number one, the incident happened sometime between one

16 and two in the morning.

It was dark.

The incident happened

17 in a parking lot outside of the Cafe Ha Vi, the parking lot
18 that is not particularly well lighted.

In fact, as the

19 witnesses testified, certain areas are in the shadow because
20 of the nature of the building and where the lights are.
21

There is a tremendous amount of distraction going on.

22 Mr. Tai Luu testified that he went out to the car and he
23 wasn't sure, remember, he had a long colloquy about whether
24 he was accompanied or whether he wasn't, and finally he
25 couldn't even remember if someone accompanied him after that
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1 were knives in her home, and she said yes, she had two sharp
2 knives.

But neither of those knives ever turned up missing.

3 Neither of them ever had a blood stain.
4

You'll recall also the testimony of Hanna Kim and you

5 will you recall that she and I had a discussion regarding
6 whether or not the assailant actually had a knife.

She

7 believed it was a knife butt and she saw a flash of blade.
8 Now, Tai Luu said the knife was seven to nine inches long.
9

If Hanna Kim is confronting my client face to face and

10 if his hands are being held up and restrained, where is the
11 knife blade?

Where is that knife blade?

You're not going to

12 be able, unless you have great big hands, and I don't, you're
13 not going to be able to hide that knife completely in your
14 hand.

The blade is going to protrude out or the handle will

15 protrude out and you're going to be holding on to the blade
16 and risk cutting up your hand.

But there's nobody's hand

17 that's going to be able to hide that entire knife within it.
18

The prosecutor has asked me and has asked you to deal

19 in possibilities, mathematical possibilities, regarding the
20 likelihood of an Asian with a tattoo in the middle of his
21 forehead being present at a certain time and place.
22 asking you to deal in possibilities.

He's

This is not proof.

23 This is not proof, let alone proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
24 It's speculation.
25

You must look at the evidence, the physical evidence,
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1 the testimony of the witnesses.

Now, when you look at that

2 evidence dispassionately, freeing yourself for —

from

3 sympathy for the victims, as well as for my client, and
4 viewing the facts as you've been instructed to do, you will
5 see that the prosecutor's case is rife with reasonable doubt.
6 And it's not just reasonable doubt as to one element, it's
7 reasonable doubt all the way through.
8

As I said before, my burden isn't to prove anything.

9 The State who brings to bear the force of organized
10 government and the power to punish is the one who must prove,
11 and I submit to you respectfully that the State has not
12 carried its burden in this case and that my client is
13 entitled to a verdict of not guilty.
14

THE COURT:

15

Mr. Castle?

16

MR. CASTLE:

Thank you.

All right, thank you, Mr. Barber.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, when I

17 spoke to you, I asked, or had hoped that defense counsel
18 would answer my question about why is it that the stabber has
19 a tattoo in the middle of his forehead and why does the
20 defendant have that same tattoo in the same location?

He

21 never answered that question.
22

Something else that didn't happen either in this case,

23 ladies and gentlemen, and that is when Mr. Barber stood up to
24 you and gave his opening statement, he said that evidence he
25 would offer was that Mr. Minh Ha was at this club, but he
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1 left before the stabbing.

That never happened.

2 himself said he was in Texas the month of 1996.

Minn Ha
His sister

3 Tran said, "Oh, yeah, oh, but he was in Salt Lake —

or Salt

4 Lake County May of 1996." They couldn't even get their
5 stories straight about when he was here.
6 here at all, he was in Texas working.

He claims he wasn't

He also said he didn't

7 have a job and that's why he went to Texas. According to
8 Tran, he did have a job and had some kind of habit about
9 coming home at a certain time.

None of that panned out in

10 terms of what the defense counsel said the evidence was going
11 to be and what it turned out to be.
12

And there is an old saying, and it is the law, the

13 defendant doesn't have to prove anything, but if they put on
14 evidence, it has to make common sense, it has to be
15 consistent.

Your decision is based on common sense and your

16 own life experiences.
17

With respect to the issue of reasonable doubt, that is

18 the burden the State has, but I want you to know and the
19 instructions so state, the State doesn't have to prove this
20 case beyond a shadow of a doubt.

There is a statement in

21 instruction number 7 that says proof beyond a reasonable
22 doubt does not require proof to an absolute certainty.
23 why do we have that standard?

Now,

The only way you would know

24 beyond a reasonable doubt or the only way you would know
25 beyond a shadow of a doubt, if you yourself had been there at
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1 the club when the stabbing occurred.

You're relying on the

2 testimony of other witnesses to inform you to make up your
3 mind.
4

One thing to remember about witnesses is that there

5 will be some minor inconsistencies, and I would submit that
6 that's what has occurred with the three witnesses that were
7 there that testified.

Why are those —

8 inconsistencies in that?
9 differently.

why are there minor

Because people see things

People remember things differently, and people

10 have their own unique way of expressing what it is they saw.
11

Remember that none of these witnesses have English as

12 their first language.

English is their second language and

13 Vu and Hanna are well spoken when it comes to English.
14 speak very good English.

They

But they're simply attempting to

15 recall what it is they saw.
16

What about this identification issue?

Remember that

17 Tai Luu identified two people in the photo lineup, two, but
18 one of those was Minh Ha.

He identified them at the

19 preliminary hearing and he identified them here in court.
20 Hanna Kim who also looked at the photo spread and that's
21 State's Exhibit 9.

She immediately identified only one

22 person and that was Minh Ha.

Think about Hanna Kim and her

23 ability to recognize.
24

This case is based upon the testimony of those three

25 people.

You can believe them all, you can believe just one.
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1 If you believe one, like Hanna Kim, the defendant is guilty
2 of this crime.

Remember she had seen him three times before.

3 She had given him her phone number.

She saw him there that

4 night at the club inside, as well as outside.
5 went toe to toe with this guy.

Remember she

She was staring him straight

6 in the face, yelling and screaming at him to stop, wondering
7 why he had acted this way, and her attention was focused on
8 his face, not on what he had in his hand.
9

Remember that Tai Luu said he was stabbed, that the

10 defendant had the knife in his right hand, and the defendant
11 told us on the stand that in fact he is right-handed.
12

I'm not talking about possibilities.

I'm simply

13 talking about reasonable conclusions from the evidence.
14 not asking you to speculate.

I'm

I'm asking you to take the

15 facts, the evidence, decide what the facts are, and then draw
16 some reasonable inferences from those facts, and the
17 instructions ask you to do that.
18

So I go back to the question, how many people are

19 going to have a tattoo in the middle of their forehead, in
20 this society?
21 defendant.

There isn't going to be anyone but the

That's how he's identified, and there might be a

22 mistake about his height, his weight, his hair style, but
23 it's unmistakable about the tattoo in the middle of his
24 forehead.
25

Why is not a knife ever found?

Well, that's easy to
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